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BIRTH CONTROL ADVICE
throw of the national government; 8 a lesser evil might not justify
governmental abridgement of free speech. In the light of these
facts, the Ohio Court of Appeals decided that under the "balancing"
test the juvenile court's judgment would have to be reversed:
Whether we apply the 'dear and present danger' test as used in
Wood v. Georgia .. .or the 'balancing of interest' test used in
Dennis v. United States... to our present fact situation, we come
to the same conclusion. The state does not have a substantial
enough interest to restrict speech in cases where a mother, in the
only way she knows how, instructs her child in ways to prevent
conception before marriage ...
Can anyone argue that it is wrong for parents to attempt to
educate their own children in areas which are grossly neglected by
our school systems? This is not only a parental right; it is a duty.
...We will not penalize a parent for not knowing how to be
more discreet in a choice of words.'"
The import of State v. McLaughlin2 ° is that parents may now
use their best efforts in counseling a child regarding matters of sex
and birth prevention without incurring the risk of later prosecution
for contributing to that child's delinquency. Ohio case law is thus
enriched by a rule which upholds freedom of speech and which pre-
dudes needless state intrusion into the privacy of the home.
CARL F. GILLOMBARDO, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONCEALED WEAPONS -
TEAR GAS PEN
State v. Umbrello, 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400 (1965)
The second amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not
be infringed."' This guarantee assures each citizen the right to
protect himself and his property; however, under modern social
conditions this right has been severely restricted. Almost every
state has enacted some legislation to control the use and possession
of arms;2 and such state legislation is supported by United States
Supreme Court decisions8 which hold that the second amendment is
binding on the federal government, but not on the states. Although
28 State v. McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 333, 212 N.E.2d 635, 639 (1965).
19 Id. at 334-35, 212 N.E.2d at 640. (Citations omitted.)
204 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.B.2d 635 (1965).
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specific state regulations differ, most jurisdictions prohibit and
penalize the carrying of concealed weapons.'
In State v. Umbrello, a defendant was charged with carrying a
loaded pistol on his person without a license, in violation of the
New Hampshire concealed weapons statute.6 The defendant moved
for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that his .410 gauge
Hercules tear gas pencil was not a loaded pistol within the mean-
ing of the statute. The motion was denied. On review, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that since the pen in its unmodified
form could not fire regulation ammunition without rupturing the
barrel, it was not a pistol within the meaning of the statute.7
The New Hampshire Supreme Court analyzed the question in
terms of more conventional weaponry, namely, the pistol or revolver,
because of the nature of the statutory language.' In so doing, the
court adopted what might be called a "capability" test. Central to
this test is the question of whether the device could, in the condition
in which it was found, perform like a conventional pistol or revol-
ver.9 Although the court considered the fact that one could fire a
I U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2 See authorities cited in 56 AM. JUR. Weapons §§ 5-9 (1947).
3 E.g., Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
4 See, e.g., FL& STAT. ANN. S§ 790.01-.05 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.01;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1271, 1272 (1951). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d
492 (1955).
5 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400 (1965).
6 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.4 (1955). The statute states:
No person shall carry a loaded pistol or revolver in any vehicle or concealed
upon his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business, without
a license therefor as hereinafter provided. A loaded pistol or revolver shall
include any pistol or revolver with a magazine, cylinder, chamber or clip in
which there are loaded cartridges. Whoever violates the provisions of this
section shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
7State v. Umbrello, 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400, 401 (1965). For the text of
the New Hampshire statute, see note 6 supra. See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.1
(1955) where "pistol," as used in § 159.4, is defined as follows:
Pistol or revolver, as used herein means any firearm with barrel less than
twelve inches in length. It does not include antique weapons incapable of
use. Ibid.
8 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.4 (1955). For the text of the statute, see note 6
supra. In particular, note the definition of "loaded pistol or revolver" contained within
S 159.4.
9 The term "capability test," as used herein, is intended to designate. the type of
analysis utilized by a court to make a disposition on an uncommon weapon under a
concealed weapons statute. Cases applying this test are rare; outside of the Umbrello




.410 shotgun shell or a .45 caliber bullet from the pen by inserting
a small steel adapter or auxiliary chamber, it was deemed controlling
that such adaptation had not in fact been made."0 Further, the court
seemed impressed by the fact that when the defendant was arrested,
no live ammunition or adapter was found on his person or in his
automobile."
The capability test utilized in Umbrello had been expounded
earlier by a New York court in construing a similarly restrictive
statute.' In People v. Anderson," it was held that a pen pri-
marily intended for the discharge of tear gas was a pistol within the
meaning of the New York statute under which the state had chosen
to prosecute.'" Like the Umbrello court, the Anderson court chose
to ignore the fact that the device did not resemble the more con-
ventional weapons. However, in Anderson it was shown that .30
and .38 caliber shells could actually be fired from the pen in the
condition in which it was found. The court encouraged a strict
policy toward such devices because "to permit the sale or possession
of such an instrument would be to encourage the carrying of con-
cealed weapons by means of a very dever ruse."' 5
Thus, underlying the capability test utilized in the Umbrello
decision is a policy to ferret out devices which, because of their un-
usual size or shape, might escape the provisions of the concealed
weapons statute. That same policy was apparently applied in
United States v. Decker.'6 In that case, a tear gas gun, in its
unaltered form, capable of firing a shotgun shell was held to be a
firearm as defined by the National Firearms Act.' Unlike Umbrello,
it was shown that a .410 gauge shotgun shell could be fired from the
unmodified gun without rupturing the barrel. On the other hand,
the court dearly indicated that a tear gas gun, capable of dis-
charging gas alone, would not be considered a firearm. Thus, the
court implied that in future cases this same capability test would be
applied to the tear gas pen, which differs from the more conven-
'0 State v. Umbrello, 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400, 401 (1965).
"Ibid.
12 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1897(4). This section deals with the possession of firearms
which may be concealed. For the relevant text of this section, see note 14 infra.
'3236 App. Div. 586, 260 N.Y. Supp. 329 (1932).
14 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1897 (4). The statute applies to "any person over the age
of sixteen years who shall have in his possession . . . any pistol, revolver or other
firearm of a size which may be concealed...."
' 
5 People v. Anderson, 236 App. Div. 586, 589, 260 N.Y. Supp. 329, 332 (1932).
S6292 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 834 (1961).
'
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 5841, 5851.
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tional tear gas gun only in that the pen usually fires a much smaller
container of gas."
If there is proof that the weapon, itself, is capable of firing live
ammunition, a strict adherence to the capability test adopted in
Umbrello does not allow a court to consider the purpose for which
the device is actually used. Nor does it allow a court to consider the
fact that the defendant had no knowledge that the weapon could
fire live ammunition. 9
Nevertheless, the capability test utilized in Umbrello is meri-
torious in many respects. For example, it acknowledges the consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to bear arms, while attempting to modify
that right to render it compatible with modern social conditions.
Further, this view prescribes practical guidelines for future rulings
on other dangerous weapons.
However, tied as this test is to a comparison with the more con-
ventional "pistol and revolver," it cannot escape inherent weak-
nesses. Foremost among these weaknesses is the fact that a majority
of purchasers of such devices as the tear gas pen, like the women
who carry them in their purses for an emergency, have neither
knowledge of nor interest in its criminal adaptability or capability.
Thus, one buyer may find himself exposed to criminal liability, while
another equally unsophisticated buyer may be immune to such
liability merely because the device he purchased was so thinly fab-
ricated as to be unable to withstand the percussion of live ammuni-
tion. A second weakness in the capability test is that as these
modern devices come to respond less and less like the conventional
pistol or revolver, the comparison between them, as a basis of
criminal liability, becomes more and more irrational. Thus, the
Umbrello court, having determined that the tear gas pen was not a
"pistol or revolver" within the meaning of the New Hampshire
statute,"° was forced to dismiss the complaint. In so doing, the
court was unable to consider that a tear gas pen, even though inca-
18 The court stated:
If the weapon could discharge a shot through the energy of an explosive, then
it was covered by the statute. In other words, a tear gas gun capable only of
discharging tear gas would not be considered as a firearm. It was a firearm
only if it could discharge a shot through the energy of an explosive. United
States v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1961).
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Fogarty, 344 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1965); Sipes v. United
States, 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 913 (1963); State v.
Wheeler, 195 Kan. 184, 403 P.2d 1015 (1965).
2 0 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.1-.4 (1955).
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TEAR GAS PEN
pable of firing or of being adapted to fire conventional bullets, may
be used with devastating effect by an assailant at dose range.
The tear gas pen is only one of the many new devices being
carried by individuals, especially in urban areas, for self defense.
Because of the relative popularity of these devices, the ease in pro-
curing them, and their low cost, the amount of litigation involving
them will probably increase as police departments attempt to mini-
mize the use of these devices. But if the capability test is applied
by the courts, many of these new devices, which are dangerous and
can be used for criminal purposes, will escape regulation. The
solution to this problem lies in the question left unanswered by the
Umbrello decision: 2' whether or not the carrying of a concealed tear
gas pen was a violation of the state's dangerous weapon statute,22
even though it was not a violation of the concealed weapon statute.
Like New Hampshire, many states have prohibited the carrying
of dangerous weapons, either as part of their general concealed weap-
ons statute"3 or as a separate enactment.24 A dangerous weapon has
been variously defined2 as an article of offense which, in its intent
or easily adapted use, is likely to produce death or serious bodily
harm. Included among the dangerous weapons are the dirk, bowie
knife, sling shot, razor, billy, false knuckles, and other like weap-
ons. 6 To determine if a device constitutes a dangerous weapon,
a court will examine the following factors: (1) the general purpose
of the device; (2) its potential for death or bodily harm; (3) the
ease with which it may be adapted to a more criminal purpose; and
21 State v. Umbrello, 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400, 401 (1965).
22 N.H. REV. STAT. AN. §5 585.26-.27 (1955).
23R.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.01-.05 (1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.423-
.424 (1962); OHiO REV. CODE § 2923.01; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 941.23 (1958).24 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 269, § 10 (Supp. 1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 585.26-.27 (1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1271, 1272 (1958). It should
be noted that the Ohio courts have not ruled on the gas pen to date. Although the
Ohio statutory structure parallels that of New Hampshire, the Ohio courts are free to
follow the more desirable "dangerous weapons" approach.
2USee, e.g., Hutton v. People, 398 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1965); Parman v. Lemmon,
119 Kan. 323, 244 Pac. 227 (1925), rev'd on other grounds, 120 Kan. 370, 244 Pac.
232 (1926); People v. Goolsby, 284 Mich. 375, 279 N.W. 867 (1938); Beeler v.
State, 334 P.2d 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959); Commonwealth v. Festa, 156 Pa. Super.
329, 40 A.2d 112 (1944). See generally Annor., 92 A.L.R. 1098 (1934).
26 Smith v. Nussman, 156 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1963) (sling shot); Jackson v. State,
231 Md. 591, 191 A.2d 432 (1963) (.22 caliber starter's gun); People v. Vaines, 310
Mich. 500, 17 N.W.2d 729 (1945) (daggers, dirks, stilettos); State v. Witcher, 58
N.J. Super. 464, 156 A.2d 709 (App. Div. 1959) (billy); State v. Vargas, 42 N.M.
1, 74 P.2d 62 (1937) (large rock); People v. Reinhardt, 42 Misc. 2d 45, 247 N.Y.S.2d
708 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (blackjack).
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(4) the circumstances under which it was used.27  Applying such
tests in a situation similar to the Umbrello case, a West Virginia
court, as early as 1934, found a tear gas pen to be a dangerous
weapon.2" The court conceded that the conventional use of the pen
was not as an offensive weapon but as a temporary defensive de-
vice. However, the court, in examining the probable effects of
firing tear gas, recognized that under proper conditions the mixture
of a small amount of gun powder and tear gas could do untold harm.
Finally, the court looked at the potential adaptability of the pen into
a weapon of a more lethal nature and found that, like a razor blade
or tire iron, the gas pen, although associated with other uses, is easily
converted into a formidable tool of destruction.
Had the state, in Umbrello, chosen to prosecute under the dan-
gerous weapon statute,29 the court would have been free to adopt a
factorial analysis8" of the gas pen instead of the restrictive capabili-
ty test. The factorial analysis is not as simple or as concise as is
the capability test; nor does this approach allow the individual any
more freedom to bear arms. However, by analyzing each device
separately, and not in relation to a pistol or revolver, the court is
able to take cognizance of the fact that danger can exist apart from
the traditional gun powder and shell. Further, the court promul-
gates a more objective standard to guide human conduct; for even
the most unsophisticated buyer is likely to recognize inherent danger
in a device, although he has no idea whether or not the device would
rupture if fired as a gun. Thus, through a device-by-device analysis,
the courts should experience little difficulty in adapting existing
legislation to meet modern ingenuity.
GERALD B. CHATTMAN
27 Village of Barboursville ex rel. Bates v. Taylor, 115 W. Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485
(1934).
28 Ibid. It is interesting that there was a decision involving a tear gas pen as early
as 1934. Research has disclosed no litigation between 1934 and 1965 involving the
pen.
2 9 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 585.26-.27 (1955).
80 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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